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Narrative Science and Narrative Knowing.  Introduction to a special issue on 
Narrative in Science 
Mary S. Morgan and M. Norton Wise 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Why does a natural historian tell narratives about ant-lions? How does the medical 
profession gain knowledge from case narratives?  Why does a physicist trace a 
mathematical simulation as intently as an author tracks the interactions of characters 
in a novel?  Why does mechanistic thinking about international confrontations only 
become coherent when made sense of by the accompanying narrative? Why do 
narrative possibilities loom larger than narrative actualities in some scientific sites? Is 
narrative the place for situating evidence, or a vehicle for re-situating concepts? How 
does narrative sometimes become the way of bringing things together, and other 
times become the medium for unfolding or revealing the path of events?  How does 
narrative at some sites integrate chunks of mathematics, at other sites act to fill in 
gaps between bits of mathematics, and in other places prove complementary to 
mathematics?  How do narratives explain in science, if indeed they do? 
 
All these hard questions, and more, arise in, and from, the papers in this special issue 
of SHPS-A, which are dedicated as much to putting these questions on the agenda as 
they are to answering them for their own specific sites and in their own specific ways 
for the history and philosophy of science.  
 
The role of narrative in the sciences has been neglected for too long, as evidenced by 
these papers devoted to the subject, for the questions they raise quickly grow from 
site specific ones into generic ones, with broader scope across a sufficient number of 
instances to be put properly on the table as legitimate questions for historians and 
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philosophers of science.  Indeed, these look hard enough questions to keep a bevy of 
us occupied for several years and through many papers.  
 
Until now, philosophers of science have not given narrative much credence as having 
any epistemological functions and, if anything, have been deeply suspicious that it 
could have any such functions.  They have sometimes used narrative case studies 
from the history of science, and very occasionally commented on their role in their 
philosophical arguments, but they have not seriously taken up any questions about 
the use of narrative in science by scientists.  By contrast, philosophers of history take 
narratives for granted but have been much exercised about their role.  Their 
arguments during the last decades have focussed particularly on the way that 
narratives serve an explanatory function in history. Roth (in this special issue) makes 
a strong philosophical argument based on the idea that historical conclusions are not 
detachable from the narratives that produce them. This implies that narratives can 
only explain in the particular context of their usage and only through retrospective 
analysis. How far this approach to history can be adapted to the narratives of science 
is unclear.  For example, there is some interesting tension here with Beatty’s account 
(this issue) of contingencies and nodal points in the histories of evolution (though no 
fundamental disagreement about whether narratives explain).  Regardless of these 
arguments, it is true that these philosophical debates have largely passed historians 
of science by, who have happily constructed narratives about scientists, and about 
their sciences, oblivious for the large part to the terms of that broader debate in 
philosophy of history.  In addition, historians of science have often ignored the way 
that their subject scientists use narrative in their work, to the extent that perhaps 
the best known study of scientific narratives is by a literature specialist (Beer, 1983).  
Historians of science apparently have not thought scientific narratives important, and 
in most fields perhaps they have not even noticed the narratives that their actors 
wove and told about their subject matters.   
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As the questions above suggest, the papers in the special issue cover an open terrain 
from narratives about ant-lions to the possibilities of narrative explanation.  Some of 
our papers are unashamedly philosophical, others outright historical, and others 
provide cross-overs between history, philosophy, and the literature of science, for 
we cannot study narratives by ignoring rhetorical and literary matters.  Our 
introduction picks out several important narrative themes that have broad scope, 
and that are expressed in these papers either specifically about a science or 
generically about a problem.  At the same time, we point out how these papers are 
provocative in knocking aside some oft-made, simple, or stereotypical, assumptions 
about there being a fundamental opposition between narrative and science, as in the 
classic formulation of Hempel on explanation necessarily depending on deduction 
from laws. Our introduction aims to show how the papers speak to each other and to 
critical questions in history and philosophy of science about what narratives do for 
the scientists who use them, whether in a natural or a human or a social science.1  
 
 
2. Coherence Making and Unfolding in Time 
The papers in this issue draw out two quite basic ways in which narratives function in 
the sciences. Not surprisingly, they feature as two prominent virtues of narratives in 
the literature on narrative. The first is that for some scientists, or at some sites of 
science, narrative works to create coherence between a variety of different elements 
that otherwise do not appear to hang together, but do need to be made to fit 
sensibly together whenever an investigator recognises that they are all elements that 
belong to the phenomenon to be described or explained.  Sometimes in science this 
variety of stuff consists in chunks of evidence from different sources and of different 
kinds and the narrative serves to situate them in relation to each other.  Sometimes 
 
1 This introduction does not pretend to offer a literature survey of the work on narrative that 
appears in philosophy of history, narrative studies and, more thinly, in history and philosophy of 
science.  Relevant references both to these generic categories of literature and to specific studies for 
the particular sciences, are given in the papers of the special issue.    
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the heterogeneity involves different pieces of theories or different conceptual 
elements. The fitting together can be thought of as a process of coherence making, 
of showing how disparate elements interrelate, so as to make an account that is 
coherent in itself, and is consistent with all the bits of scientific stuff on the table, 
perhaps reaching for integration or synthesis (Morgan, this issue).  Sometimes the 
construction of the narrative serves to show gaps in evidence that might then be 
filled through the search for further evidence (Currie and Sterelny in 
paleoanthropology, this issue).  Other-times, the stitching together of the narrative 
offers the scientist a process to figure out where and why the different explanatory 
devices and situational elements fit together, knowing that they need to be aligned 
to make any kind of joined-up account of the matter (Crasnow in political science, 
this issue).  At still other-times, there is a combination - a process of throwing out 
and taking in both possible explanations and shards of evidence during successive re-
descriptions in order to make a fruitful fit between the scientist’s projections and 
their experience, as in medical diagnosis (Hurwitz, and see Ankeny, 2011).  Narrative 
then provides a natural form for bringing related elements into order or creating 
order out of dis-ordered materials which can be brought into connection with each 
other (Morgan’s account of social anthropologycommunity studies, this issue).  
  The second prominent way in which many of our papers show narrative 
functioning in the sciences, concerns its use in making things known and 
understandable by revealing how, like a story, they “unfold” in time. This is 
sometimes done by tracing processes backward in time (Roth, this issue).  This can 
reveal twists, turns, and contingencies, paths not taken, opportunities forgone, even 
moments of regret (Beatty, this issue).  Or it can be done by following forward the 
processes by which things do unfold in time towards a denouement (Wise, this 
issue).  Both forward following, and backward tracing reveal narrative paths that are 
neither fully predictable nor fully explainable, yet create narrative accounts that are 
themselves a source of illumination to the scientist (Wise, Beatty, this issue).  Here 
again narrative provides a natural format for describing development and change 
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through time, with later states unfolding from earlier ones in sometimes convoluted 
paths. These are features that fit the basic sense and definition of what a narrative is 
and does. This function of narrative is particularly apparent in the case of complex 
systems, whether describing specific physical processes (the growth of snowflakes, 
see Wise 2011) or broad historical developments (industrialization), in which 
multiple factors interact and no overarching theory can predict exactly what will 
happen.  
 
We must stress immediately, however, that although narrative provides a natural 
form for both coherence making and unfolding in time, and indeed may be 
irreplaceable in some areas (Roth on history, this issue), its value should not be 
thought of as limited to situations where theory is less than effective. Having a 
relevant theory does not substitute for having a rich narrative and having a good 
narrative may well embed a relevant theory: the two forms are not exclusive and 
may well reinforce each other. 
 
 
3. Possibilities and Counterfactuals 
Narrative’s irreplaceability for certain domains of science suggests another of the 
great assets of thinking and reasoning explicitly in such a form. In the context both of 
coherence making and temporal unfolding, a narrative account makes it easy to think 
not just about contingencies, but about possibilities, and counterfactuals. Narratives 
deal in these characteristics routinely.  By contrast, the notions of determinism and 
indeterminism, which so firmly shaped past discussions of explanation using 
scientific laws in the philosophy community, seem in this framework unhelpful to say 
the least.  Rather, the explanatory power of narratives lies in being able to chart a 
satisfactory path not just through contingencies, possibilities and alternatives, but to 
do so by making active use of those features.  The fact that these characteristics of 
narrative are taken to be routine opens up the discussion of scientific explanation 
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into more sophisticated directions.  Because these possibilities in narratives arise 
from considerations of the paths taken and not taken, they enable assessments of 
the critical junctions or nodes in the path. The alternatives at each nodal point may 
be rather limited, equivalent to those faced by a participant in an historical event, or 
character in a novel, but sometimes in science these nodal points may offer many 
possibilities and many framings. Where situations are highly constrained by many 
factors, the scientific narrative will likely pay deep attention to those nodal points of 
decision, the possible alternative narrative paths they prompt, and the outcomes of 
those paths, to see why some paths offer more plausible accounts of outcomes than 
others (Crasnow, this issue).   Where there are multiple possibilities, and multiple 
possible paths taken and not taken, as in evolutionary biology, that attention is 
required to figure out which nodal points really mattered in re-playing the narrative 
tapes of the scientific problem at issue (Beatty, this issue). Paying deep attention 
may require a serious search over those alternative paths, with explicit regard to the 
counterfactuals and their attendant possible outcomes.  In all of these cases it is 
consideration of how a process might have been different, under different conditions 
and with different consequences, which illuminates the path that was taken, or 
indeed the multiple paths that have been taken in view of the variety of events and 
outcomes found for example, in evolutionary biology as much as in social 
anthropology.   
 
 
 
4. Mathematical Models and Narratives 
It is at this point, where we have recognised that narrative is associated with multiple 
possibilities, that we can recognise a more surprising link found in the scientists’ 
toolbox, namely between the use of mathematical models and narratives.  
Mathematical modelling and narrative presentation are often presumed to be 
antithetical: that is, a person deals in one or the other way of reasoning.  But, in 
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practice, scientific work is not so dichotomous.  Very often mathematical models and 
narratives function together and are complementary in a variety of ways.  Use of a 
mathematical model may be accompanied by a set of narratives that explore the 
logical implications of the model in answering a set of questions, or an alternative set 
of parameter values: each new set-up starts a chain of reasoning using the 
interrelations of the elements in the model, thus enabling the scientist to explore the 
character and the identity of a theory instantiated in the model (see Morgan 2001, 
2012).  A similar model-narrative interrelationship appears in simulations of systems 
whose complexity defies an approach through a nicely unified mathematical model 
that is analysable in itself. Running the simulation repeatedly while adjusting 
components and parameters in the model, can facilitate creation of an increasingly 
comprehensive narrative describing the process being simulated. Even subtle 
variations in the model can lead to different paths of development and thus different 
narratives.  Where the simulation possibilities seem almost infinite, as with some 
models, it is the function of narratives to reveal those possibilities that provides the 
narrative payoff. In these cases the world is better represented, and better grasped, 
by exploring the mathematical model and the possible narratives in interaction than 
through either alone (see Wise on snowflakes and chemical bonding, (2011) and this 
issue). Even when mathematical solutions are available, accompanying narratives 
provide additional understanding, for they capture the process and its possible range 
in a way that abstract formalism cannot. 
 
A rather different function that narratives fulfil in some circumstances is to provide 
the umbrella account in which mathematical elements also feature.  It is not just that 
the narrative fills in gaps that occur between different chunks of mathematics 
(though it may do so) but that it plays a stronger function as the overall integrating 
device which joins together those bits of mathematical modelling appropriate for 
separate parts of a process (see Rosales on evolution, this issue).  Another 
complementary functional usage occurs when the narrative is used as the matching 
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device that enables scientists to map the mathematical elements of their theory or 
causal mechanism onto the events and situations in the world: narratives offer the 
flexibility to provide a trial and fit activity (Morgan 2007). In still other situations, a 
mathematical model and a narrative may act in opposing but complementary ways, 
with the model providing a more precise but more limited perspective and the 
narrative a more informal but broader one (Currie and Sterelny on 
paleoanthropology, this issue).  
 
 
5. Causality and Temporality 
Very often these complementary usages of mathematical models and narratives rely 
on, or build upon, an appeal to ambiguity about causality and temporality in giving 
accounts of the scientific phenomena at hand.  Perhaps the deepest reflections 
coming from these papers on narrative in science are those that rely on these 
ambiguities to challenge the notion and character of narrative as a category.  The 
two most basic ideas among narratologists are a) that a narrative gives an account 
over time, and b) that a narrative is not a chronicle - not a mere sequence in time - 
but concerns connected elements.  Beyond that, subdivisions of definitions abound, 
based on events, beginnings-middles-ends, changes in state, contingency, etc.  But 
the papers in this issue - writing and thinking about narratives in science - really pick 
away in special directions at these basic notions, and do something to subvert the 
basic ways of thinking that have inhabited discussions on this front in the literary 
domain.   
 
Consider first b), the chronicle issue.  The narratological literature takes the 
difference between a chronicle and a narrative to be that a narrative offers relational 
elements that join together a sequence of events, whereas a chronicle just lists 
them.  This immediately, in the scientific domain, moves the narrative into 
explanatory territory, both in the task of teasing apart and/or putting together the 
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causal or implied causal relations between events in the narrative, and in making 
some sense of this in scientific terms. Thus the once-common idea that narratives 
cannot explain is problematic from the start (Roth, Beatty, this issue). Of course this 
is all grist to the mill of those who take working practice to be the basis of 
understanding and explanation - trying to figure how things fit together, how they 
relate, what effect some cause might have, what cause might have produced this 
effect.  We see this in several papers. What set of conditions add together to 
constitute (create?) a particular medical condition (Hurwitz, this issue)? Which set of 
actions lead to confrontations in international relations and which ones resolve 
them?  Which causal mechanism - with its elements, organisations, and emergent 
capacities, creates (or does not) an outcome? And is the abstract skeletal mechanism 
sufficient in its bare bones to give a credible account or do we need not just the 
skeleton but the flesh that creates the full narrative to make it a viable account? 
(Crasnow, this issue)  
 
How about a), temporality itself? Narratives tell stories over time, don’t they?  
Maybe, but it is at least not obvious what kinds of time.  Some scientific narratives of 
course do happen to hook onto real time events, the regular repeating 
developmental narratives of the animal and plant kingdoms, the long durée 
narratives of evolution, the extremely fast narratives of chemical bonding.  But we 
already suggested with respect to the relation of mathematical models and narrative, 
that some scientific narratives tell of events in the logical time of the model: when 
event A is causally related to a subsequent collection of events B, C, D etc., those 
relations define the sequence, and there is no time unit attached to those sequences 
that prompt the narratives, thus the notion of ‘logical time’ (see Klein 1997). These 
narratives might include possibilities, probabilities, and contingencies, but still be in 
some non-real time frame. The fact that narratives may not hook onto time, but do 
require attention to relationships suggests already that what might be critical to the 
notion of narrative is not time, but ordering (Morgan, this issue).  Such ordering 
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could be that of the causal (or logical) ordering of a mechanism-based narrative, it 
could be a pragmatic narrative ordering based on time, but it could even be a non-
time, non-logical, ordering.  The interleaving elements of a culture need to be 
ordered to create that tapestry that is narrated, but there is often no relevant time - 
real or logical - that will provide that ordering to show how the elements in that 
culture relate and how to narrate their interrelations.   
 
 
6. Narrators and narrated 
If science has narratives, it must also have narrators.  One of the hallmarks of 
modern science is thought to be an attachment to objectivity, yet in some sciences 
the scientist presents her or himself as narrator.  Is there a fundamental difference 
between sites of science where the scientist is present only as an impersonal 
narrator and those where he or she is also an actor in the narrative? Whereas it 
might seem that the demands for scientific credibility would always require a 
suitably scientific style of detachment – stereotypically writing in the third person 
passive voice to make nature seem to speak for itself – this goal is by no means 
always warranted.  Scientists are present in their narrative whenever they act in it, 
and the narrative would make no sense if they were written out – they appear in 
medical case narratives of diagnosis or treatment (Hurwitz, this issue), or natural 
historical narratives where scientists are experimenters rather than just observers 
(Terrall, this issue), that is, when they ‘don’t just peer, interfere!’ (Hacking, 1983).   
But there is another site where narrators are habitually present - that of 
anthropological work and social science case studies in live time.  Here the scientist is 
present playing a dual role, both as a confused but reflective participant, and then 
if/when confusion is resolved, as the narrator throwing explanatory light on the 
situation (Morgan, this issue). Similarly, those social scientists who place themselves 
firmly in their narratives inevitably produce accounts that embed autobiographical 
elements.  This participant-narrator is not just a community preference, rather such 
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presence gives the investigator space to establish their credibility and serve to let the 
reader in as a vicarious ‘witness’ to their field work.  There is also an historical point 
here: whereas natural historians routinely appeared in their narratives in the 18th 
and 19th centuries, they are more likely to be absent in 20th century papers.  
Similarly, while in some medical case narratives, or in some periods of such narrative 
accounts, the medical scientist or professional might adopt a detached position 
(appearing only briefly in a metaphorically anonymous white coat), in others their 
presence is used to allow them to convey a sense of unpredictability, or surprise, or 
difficulty about their account of the case at hand.   
 
The presence or absence of scientists in their narratives has particular importance for 
the literary quality of the narrative, which too plays a part.  While some medical 
narratives adopt the detective novel genre of following clues, others are more like 
suspense stories, and genres of fictional writing might be shamelessly evoked not 
just in titles but in styles of writing, such as recounted by Hurwitz in ‘the case of the 
nail in the boot’ (this issue).  But the conscious adoptions of style and genre are not 
limited to those cases of the human sciences where there is an interaction between 
scientist and human patient.  Narratives of the vicious behaviour of ant-lions in 
capturing innocent lesser insects, inflicting violent death against the valiant struggles 
of the prey are horror stories indeed, particularly where the prey insect is eaten alive 
while they still struggle.  But these horrors are almost matched by the violent terms 
used by scientists to describe their own experimental procedures and interventions - 
seizing their insect subjects, cutting off their limbs, throwing them into various 
liquids, and watching their tortures.  Such vigorous narrative accounts, stressing the 
active participation of the scientist, enable the community to be a virtual witness to 
the experimental activities much as the anthropologists let readers experience their 
field work. 
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7. Explanation and Understanding 
Terrall’s natural historical scientists regularly construct narratives which provide 
accounts of the behaviour of their phenomena that have some generality.  For 
example, ant-lions are shown to behave consistently, and narratives of those 
consistent behaviour patterns reflect the scientists’ explanations and understandings 
of the behaviours.  And regardless of whether the scientist is explicitly or implicitly 
the narrator, the evidence of the papers in this special issue suggests that their 
narratives provide explanations or understanding that have potentially broader writ 
for those scientists who use them.  Yet these broader characteristics and usages of 
such narrative explanations appear hard to pin down.  Crasnow argues that 
narratives provide more coherent explanations for their users than simple 
mechanistic accounts of, for example, why democracies don’t go to war; Rosales 
focuses on how narratives provide a more joined up explanation of distinct processes 
in evolution; and Morgan suggests the conceptual elements of narratives provide the 
vehicles for re-situating explanations elsewhere.  In these three accounts, narratives 
can be used to explain particular cases, but it is equally so that those narrative 
accounts may be taken by the scientists concerned to be generically applicable to 
similar situations and contexts in their fields.  What counts as explanation, and 
understanding, within a science depends less on a universal ideal, than on what 
satisfies the scientific norms and values and shared knowledge set of a community. 
The scientist as narrator - constructing a narrative of a particular sort, aimed at 
reaching an audience of other scientists within a particular context - sits at the centre 
of such scientific activity.  All of the papers in our special issue reinforce this basic 
point and strive to make clear its significance for scientific knowledge. 
 
Community practices and values, and the presence of the scientists themselves 
interacting with the objects and subjects of their science, are elements that have 
recently become prominent in discussions about the relation between understanding 
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and explanation offered by de Regt et al (2009).2   Philosophers of science have 
traditionally treated understanding as something that follows from explanation.  
Explanation itself, since the decline of the Hempelian deductive-nomological view in 
the 1970s, has been based variously on unifying theory, or more narrowly on causal 
mechanisms, or more pragmatically on answers to why questions. All of these 
approaches remain important, but particularly relevant for us here is the pragmatic 
view, in which explanation is understood to be context dependent.  Giving credence 
to context and to community (first and foremost the scientists themselves and their 
community, but more broadly the various publics who interact with and use science) 
is consistent with renewed attention to understanding as a category much broader 
than explanation.  Understanding emerges in this recent work as supplying some of 
the things that were previously thought to depend on explanation, but might now be 
thought to emerge from scientific practice and experience: knowledge of causal 
connections, necessity, possibility, even unification.   
 
It may be immediately apparent that this broader conception of the relation of 
understanding to explanation needs to incorporate the role of narrative, even calls 
out for it. If the practices of narrative are to be added to this account of 
understanding, the first thing to note is that these practices are far more various 
than one might suppose.  Narrative does not just exist in the spoken word or text, it 
exists in the combination of words, diagrams, videos, pictures, and labels and notes. 
It does not just consist in a joined up beginning-middle-end account, but in the 
exacting narrative description of the behaviours of an organism which has eluded 
categorization (Terrall), or in the possibilities of successive re-description until a 
diagnostic answer to a problem is found (Hurwitz), or out of successive simulation 
runs of a model until understanding and insight are gained (Wise), or even in 
answering questions which seem unanswerable to begin with (Morgan). While 
narrative practices differ radically across the many sciences, the endemic if not 
 
2 The following remarks draw on the editors’ introductory essay, “Focusing on Scientific Understanding,” in de 
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chronic use of narrative in science and its regular recurrence speak to the 
possibilities of what we like to call ‘narrative knowing’: accounts of phenomena that 
can only be known, or be best known, via narrative.  According to the papers in this 
special issue, narrative knowing is most relevant when the scientific phenomena 
involve complexity, variety, and contingency, and when materials need to be 
carefully ordered in relation to one another or to time for their implications to be 
understood and their behaviours explained.   But this list of the types of places where 
narrative knowing may occur is only a starting point, for further and wider study is 
needed to tease apart the relation of scientific understanding to narrative knowing.  
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